Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1990

State of Utah v. Steven Ray Allen : Brief of Appellee
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Robert N. Parrish; assistant attorney general; attorney for appellee.
Eric P. Swenson, Michael H. Wray; attorneys for appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Allen, No. 900156.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2932

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

KF'i

BRIEF.

45.9
iS9
DOCKET HO. •

—*——— IN THE
TH SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE

vjr

P l a i n l i i i / A p p o l J i .-,

:

v.

:

STEVEN 17 AY AT.TiRM,

:

riori ty N<

Hi 'I i >in liinI / A p p e l l a n t , , :
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
THIS IS AN APPEAL OF A CONVICTION OF MURDER
IN THE SECOND DEGREE, A FIRST DEGREE FELONY,
IN VIO
ON OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-203
(Supp. 1986), IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY,
S^.
wi" UTAH, THE HONORABLE BOYD BUNNELL,
PRESIDING.

R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312)
Attorney General
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS (3039)
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1022
Attorneys for Appellee

. SWENSON
:>. Box 940
-.«

'-el 3 ^ i

i, h WRAY
exchange Place #r
t Lake City, ut*

,_ .-or

FILED
SEP 3 o 1991
CLERK SUPREME COURT
UTAH

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 900156
Priority No. 2

v.
STEVEN RAY ALLEN,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
THIS IS AN APPEAL OF A CONVICTION OF MURDER
IN THE SECOND DEGREE, A FIRST DEGREE FELONY,
IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-203
(Supp. 1986), IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE BOYD BUNNELL,
PRESIDING.

R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312)
Attorney General
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS (3039)
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1022
Attorneys for Appellee

ERIC P. SWENSON
P.O. Box 940
Monticello, Utah

84535

MICHAEL H. WRAY
9 Exchange Place #900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

iii
1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE
REVIEW

1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

4

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
ARGUMENT
POINT I

19

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED EVIDENCE
THAT THE VICTIM FIT THE CRITERIA OF A
BATTERED CHILD AND PROPERLY ALLOWED TESTIMONY
OF DEFENDANT'S PRIOR ABUSE OF THE CHILD . . . . 21

Factual Background

21

Battered Child Syndrome

23

Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence

25

Bill of Particulars and Election of Theories . . . . 28
Motion for General Verdict with Interrogatories. . . 32
POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED DEFENDANT'S
INCRIMINATING STATEMENTS MADE TO LAW
ENFORCEMENT

32

The voluntary nature of the statements

34

Miranda and Invocation of Counsel

40

Corpus Delicti

44

Findings and Conclusions

45

POINT III THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO INSTRUCT
THE JURY ON THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES OF
NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE, AGGRAVATED ASSAULT AND
CHILD ABUSE WHERE THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE TO
SUPPORT ACQUITTAL OF THE GREATER OFFENSE AND
CONVICTION UNDER ANY OF THE LESSER OFFENSES . . 46

POINT IV

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED AUTOPSY
PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE VICTIM PROBATIVE OF THE
CHILD'S CASE OF DEATH

50

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED EVIDENCE
THAT DEFENDANT HAD DESTROYED PARTS OF DEBORAH
BARRIE'S DIARY WHICH RELATED TO INCIDENTS OF
ABUSE

52

THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL, TOGETHER
WITH ALL REASONABLE INFERENCES, IS SUFFICIENT
TO SUSTAIN DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION FOR MURDER
IN THE SECOND DEGREE; THEREFORE, THE COURT
PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS TO
DISMISS, MOTION FOR AN ARREST OF JUDGMENT,
AND MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

55

POINT V

POINT VI

POINT VII THE CONCEPT OF CUMULATIVE ERROR DOES NOT
APPLY WHERE NO SUBSTANTIAL ERRORS WERE
COMMITTED

60

CONCLUSION

60

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED
Page
Arizona v. Fulminante. Ill S.Ct. 1246 (1991)

38

Boggess v. State. 655 P.2d 654 (Utah 1982)

48

Commonwealth v. Labbe. 373 N.E.2d 227 (Mass. App. 1978) . . .

24

Crane v. Kentucky. 476 U.S. 683, 106 S.Ct. 2142 (1986)

39

...

Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 164 Utah Adv. Rep.
3 (Utah June 28, 1991)

3, 59

Edwards v. Arizona. 451 U.S. 477, 101 S. Ct. 1880 (1981)

. . 42

Lego v. Twomev. 404 U.S. 477, 92 S.Ct. 619 (1972)

34

McNeil v. Wisconsin. Ill S.Ct. 2204 (1991)

40, 41

Michigan v. Moslev. 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321 (1975)

....

40

Michigan v. Tucker. 417 U.S. 433, 94 S. Ct. 2357 (1974) . . .

40

People v. Jackson. 18 Cal.App.3d 504, 95 Cal.Rptr. 919
(Calif. App. 1971)

24

Ramon v. Farr. 770 P.2d 131 (Utah 1989)

2

Scharf v. BMG Corp.. 700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985)

56

Schleredt v. State. 311 N.W.2d 843 (Minn. 1981)

26

Schleret v. State. 311 N.W.2d 843 (Minn. 1981)

59

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct.
2041 (1973)

34

State v. Baker. 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983)

46, 47

State v. Bell. 770 P.2d 100 (Utah 1988)

2, 28, 30, 33

State v. Bishop. 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988) . . . .
State v. Butler. 560 P.2d 1136 (Utah 1977)

34, 38, 43, 44

. . . . 2, 28, 30, 32

State v. Cantu. 750 P.2d 591 (Utah 1988)

48

State v. Cloud. 722 P.2d 750 (Utah 1986)

50

State v. Cobb. 774 P.2d 1123 (Utah 1989)

51

State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221 (Utah 1989)

„ . . 57

State v. Eldredoe, 773 P.2d 29 (Utah 1989)

59

State v. Ellis. 748 P.2d 188 (Utah 1987)

3, 60

State v. Featherson. 781 P.2d 424 (Utah 1989)

28

State v. Fulton. 742 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1987), cert.
denied. Fulton v. Utah. 484 U.S. 1044 (1988)

29

State v. Garcia. 663 P.2d 60 (Utah 1983)

52, 55

State v. Gentry. 747 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1987)

1

State v. Gotschall. 782 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989)

49

State v. Holland. 346 N.W.2d 302 (S.D. 1984)

26, 59

State v. Johnson. 774 P.2d 1141 (Utah 1989)

„ .... 3

State v. Kniaht. 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987)

1

State v. Laffertv, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988)

50, 51

State v. Mitchell. 571 P.2d 1351 (Utah 1977)

28

State v. Moore. 697 P.2d 233 (Utah 1985)

34

State v. Phillips. 399 S.E.2d 293 (N.C.), cert, denied,
Phillips v. North Carolina. Ill S. Ct. 2804 (1991) - . 25, 59
State v. Poe. 21 Utah 2d 113, 441 P.2d 512 (1968) . . . . . . 51
State v. Ramirez, 159 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 (Utah April
23, 1991)

1-3- 35, 43, 50

State v. Rocco. 795 P.2d 1116 (Utah 1990)

28

State v. Russell. 733 P.2d 162 (Utah 1987)

31, 32

State v. Schoefeld. 545 P.2d 193 (Utah 1976)

48

State v. Standiford. 769 P.2d 254 (Utah 1988) . . . .

31, 32, 48

State v. Steqqel. 660 P.2d 252 (Utah 1983)

45

State v. Strand. 720 P.2d 425 (Utah 1986)

30

State v. Talbot. 665 P.2d 1274 (Utah 1983)

23

State v. Tanner. 675 P.2d 539 (Utah 1983)
State v. Valdez. 748 P.2d 1050 (Utah 1989)

23-25, 27, 58
50-52

State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 449 (Utah 1986)

46-48

State v. Walker, 595 P.2d 1098 (Kan. 1979)

55

State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839 (Utah 1988)

23

Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, No. 900112-CA
(Utah App. September 6, 1991)

50

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES & RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109 (Supp. 1986)
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 1986)
Utah Code Ann. S 78-2-2 (Supp. 1991)

4, 31, 32
....

1, 4, 31, 32, 56
1

Utah R. Crim. P. 19

47

Utah R. Crim. P. 23

59

Utah R. Evid. 403

20, 39, 50

Utah R. Evid. 802

52

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 900156
Priority No. 2

v.
STEVEN RAY ALLEN,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of murder in the
second degree, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 1986).

This Court has jurisdiction to

hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (Supp. 1991).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The following issues are presented on appeal:
1.

Did the trial court properly admit evidence of

battered child syndrome and of defendant's prior acts of abuse of
the victim?

Evidentiary rulings are reviewed on appeal under a

correction of error standard; however, the trial court's
subsidiary factual determinations will be given deference and
reversed only if clearly erroneous.

State v. Ramirez. 159 Utah

Adv. Rep. 7, 16 n.3 (Utah April 23, 1991).

An erroneous

evidentiary ruling will not result in reversal of a conviction
unless the admission resulted in prejudice to the defendant.
State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032, 1035 (Utah 1987); State v.

Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987).
As sub-issues to this point, did the court properly
deny a motion for bill of particulars, a motion to elect and a
motion for a general verdict form with special interrogatories?
These are issues of law dependent upon the trial court's
subsidiary factual determinations. As such, the rulings are
reviewed on appeal under a correction of error standard; however,
the trial court's subsidiary factual determinations will be given
deference and reversed only if clearly erroneous.

State v. Bell,

770 P.2d 100, 104 (Utah 1988); State v. Butler, 560 P.2d 1136,
1138 (Utah 1977).

Accord State v. Ramirez, 159 Utah Adv. Rep. at

16 n.3.
2.

Did the trial court correctly deny defendant's

motion to suppress and properly admit into evidence defendant's
confession?

This is an evidentiary issue, reviewable on appeal

under the Ramirez standard enunciated in paragraph 1.
3.

Did the trial court properly deny defendant's

requests for jury instructions on the lesser included offenses of
negligent homicide, aggravated assault and child abuse?

Whether

a defendant is entitled to a lesser included offense instruction
is a question of law and is reviewed on appeal under a correction
of error standard.
4.

Ramon v. Farr, 770 P.2d 131, 133 (Utah 1989).

Did the trial court properly admit into evidence

autopsy photographs of the victim?

Evidentiary rulings are

reviewed under the Ramirez standard enunciated in paragraph 1.
5.

Did the trial court properly admit testimony of
2

defendant's partial destruction of a diary which contained
information relative to defendant's conduct toward the victim?
The applicable standard of review is the Ramirez standard stated
in paragraph 1.
6.

Was there sufficient evidence presented at trial to

sustain defendant's conviction for murder in the second degree?
A jury verdict should be viewed in the light most favorable to
upholding it and will only be reversed when reasonable minds must
have entertained a reasonable doubt that defendant committed the
crime of which he was convicted.

State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d

1141, 1147 (Utah 1989).
As sub-issues of tnis point, did the trial court abuse
its discretion in denying defendant's motion to arrest judgment
and motion for new trial?

The trial court's decision to grant or

deny a motion for new trial will only be reversed "if there is no
reasonable basis for the decision."

Crookston v. Fire Insurance

Exchange, 164 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 10 (Utah June 28, 1991).
7.

Did the trial court commit multiple, substantial

errors such that the doctrine of cumulative error would apply?
No standard of review is applicable.

State v. Ellis. 748 P.2d

188, 191 (Utah 1987).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The applicable constitutional provisions, statutes and
rules for a determination of this case are set out in the body of
this brief.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On May 10, 1988, an information was issued against
defendant for the crimes of child abuse, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-109 (Supp. 1986), and murder in the second
degree, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
76-5-203 (Supp. 1986) (R. 10-12, 28-29).

On August 12, 1989,

defendant was arrested (R. 31-32; T. 595). On February 12, 1990,
the court granted defendant's motion to sever for trial the child
abuse counts from the murder charge (R. 92-93, 248, 430).
From February 26 through March 2, 1990, a jury trial on
the murder charge was held before the Honorable Boyd Bunnell,
Seventh Judicial District Court, Grand County, Utah (R. 615-22).
A guilty verdict was returned as charged (R. 614). Defendant
moved to arrest judgment on the basis that the evidence was
insufficient for conviction (R. 623-28).

On March 12, 1990, the

motion was denied and defendant was sentenced to the statutory
term of five years to life in the Utah State Prison (R. 629, 63032).

Defendant then moved for a new trial on the basis of

insufficient evidence and claims of erroneous trial evidentiary
rulings (R. 634-41).
660).

The motion for new trial was denied (R.

Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal (R. 673).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Defendant, Steven Ray Allen, is a college graduate with

a degree in Russian and knowledge of three other foreign
languages (T. 704-05).

He served with the Intercept Intelligence

Gathering Commission of the United States Air Force and was
4

employed by the Idaho Nuclear Energy Air Laboratory (T. 704-06).
In 1982, he abandoned his employment, sold or gave away all his
possessions, "headed for the high country" and opted to live the
"reclusive lifestyle" of a mountain man (T. 707). Except for the
time pertinent to this case, he continued to live as a mountain
man until his arrest in 1989 (T. 707-08, 710).
In September, 1986, defendant met Deborah Barrie in
Moab, Utah (T. 189, 710, 713). Divorced, Debbie had two
children, three-year-old Michael and five-year-old Matthew (T.
188).

Prior to meeting defendant, Michael had been a "happy

little boy," "healthy," and "full of fun" (T. 190, 719-20).

By

December 16, 1986, Michael was dead (T. 361).
Within two weeks of defendant's involvement in his
life, Michael began sustaining injuries.

In early October, 1986,

Debbie left her children alone with defendant for two hours.
When she returned, Mikie's nose, forehead and hands were scraped
and he had a bump on his forehead.

Defendant said Mikie had

failed to put his hands out and catch himself as he was falling
(T. 191). That night, Mikie appeared withdrawn and would not
join his family and defendant.

This was unusual for Mikie (T.

192).
Defendant moved in with Debbie (T. 196). Immediately,
they began arguing about the children.
and Matthew as undisciplined.

Defendant viewed Mikie

He did not think that Debbie

neglected the children because, in his words, they were
"healthy," "fairly happy," "normal" boys, but he believed that

5

she failed to sufficiently control them (T. 719-20).

Debbie, in

part, agreed but thought defendant was too "gruff," especially
with Mikie.

After defendant "hostile[ly]" insisted that Mikie

wear a cow bell around his neck so he would not get lost, Debbie
tearfully confronted defendant.

Defendant responded that the

boys were "damn bawl babies" and that "he had put up with enough
bull shit in his life; that he wasn't about to put [up] with any
more from a little kid; that he wanted to have a relationship
with [Debbie], but things needed changing with [the] kids" (T.
193-94).
Others also observed defendant's hostile manner towards
Mikie.

Matthew Barrie testified that at first Mikie and he liked

defendant.

As long as Debbie was around, defendant would treat

the boys nicely.

But when she was gone, defendant would "be mean

to us and kick us and be really mean" (T. 320-21).

Matthew

observed defendant hurt Mikie on several occasions, usually by
punching Mikie in the stomach (T. 320-21).

Once, Matthew saw

defendant punch Mikie in the chest area and knock him down (T.
321, 322-23).

More than once, Matthew saw defendant kick Mikie,

usually with his hiking shoes in the "bottom" but sometimes up
farther (T. 324). Matthew observed bruises on Mikie's back and
stomach.

Mikie appeared scared and would cry after defendant

"beat him up," but never talked about the incidents with his
brother (T. 320-22).

Defendant was the only person Matthew saw

hurt Mikie in this way (T. 328-29).
Martha Sullivan, Mikie's twelve-year-old cousin, saw
6

defendant hurt Mikie (T. 349f 353). The first time was when
Mikie dug a hole outside and went to the bathroom.

Defendant got

mad, grabbed Mikie by the shoulders and hair and shook him.
Defendant then dragged Mikie and lifted his feet off the ground
(T. 350-51, 354-56; Exhibit 12). The next day, Mikie told Martha
that defendant had been "mean" to him and had pulled his hair
"really hard" (T. 351; Exhibit 12). Another time, when Mikie
would not stop crying, defendant angrily forced Mikie to sit in
the snow, clad only in his underwear (T. 352).
Mikie changed.

He expressed reluctance to stay alone

with defendant (T. 194-5, 207). He would cringe if picked up
under his armpits (T. 203). Mikie developed a bald spot the size
of a silver dollar on the back of his head.
bruises over his body.

He had numerous

His balance and eyesight seemed poor.

complained of stomachaches and headaches (T. 203-04).

He

He became

"clingy," "would cry a lot" and was unusually silent (T. 203-04).
Debbie and defendant continued to disagree over the
children's discipline (T. 197). Debbie observed bruising on
Mikie's "butt" and confronted defendant.

Defendant said that

when Mikie failed to help him carry some wood, he had kicked him.
Defendant claimed "he had been bare footed, and he hadn't done it
that hard or that many times" (T. 198). He stated that Mikie
must have something medically wrong with him to bruise as he did
(T. 199). Subsequently, defendant admitted to Debbie that he had
kicked Mikie with his boots but insisted that it was "not that
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hard" and that his shoelaces must have caused the injuries (T.
202).
As Mikie continued to exhibit bruises and lack of
balance, Debbie decided to take him to the doctor (T. 204). The
doctor asked Debbie to explain the numerous bruises; she
responded that she had hoped he would.

Laughingly, the doctor

suggested that Mikie had been "shoved . . . off the roof" (T.
204-05).

The doctor pressed on Mikie's stomach and spine but not

his rib area.

No x-rays were taken.

were prescribed (T. 205-06).

A suppository and Tylenol

When Debbie told defendant that the

doctor had found nothing wrong with Mikie, defendant said, "See,
I told you he was playing little games with you" (T. 207).
In late November, defendant and Debbie bought a
motorcycle (T. 207). When defendant asked Mikie to come for a
ride, Mikie declined and started crying.
to "boot [Mikie's] butt."

Defendant told Debbie

Reluctantly, Mikie went (T. 207-08).

When they returned, Mikie was crying and silent.
why Mikie was crying.

Defendant responded, "Why?

Debbie asked
He was happy

with me" (T. 208). When Debbie asked again, defendant told her
that he had hit some loose gravel and tipped over the motorcycle
but that neither one of them got hurt (T. 209). Debbie examined
Mikie and found a bump on his forehead, general scrapes and his
eyes were not focused.

She thought he had a slight concussion

(T. 209).
On December 14, 1986, two days before he died, Mikie
starting crying early in the morning.
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When Debbie was unable to

stop the crying, defendant grabbed Mikie and took him to the
basement (T. 209-10).

Debbie followed when she heard muffled

sounds (T. 210). She saw defendant hanging Mikie by the hood of
a coat.

Mikie's face was red and his eyes were bulging.

He was

not struggling; his arms and legs were limp (T. 210, 211).
Debbie testified that defendant
had Mikie hanging over his right shoulder.
Mikie's back was to Ray's [defendant's] back.
And I ran around and I grabbed Mikie, and I
yelled at Matt — at Ray: "He can't breathe.
Let go of him." And he said: "I know." And
I said: "Let go. He can't breathe." And he
said: "I don't care." And I said: "I know
you don't care. Let go." And finally he let
go.
(T. 210). Debbie carried Mikie to her pickup and left (T. 210).
She returned that night (T. 211). Debbie and defendant
fought.

Debbie said he was too rough with the children, that he

was bruising them and that he was not to touch them again (T.
211).

Defendant apologized but angrily told her, "That little

three-year old is bugging me, and nobody fucks with me" (T. 212).
Defendant admitted that he had backhanded Mikie, knocking him
"really hard" onto the basement's cement floor

(T. 212).

Defendant said that if he was not going to be allowed to
discipline Mikie, Debbie better keep him "out of his face" (T.
212).

He said she was undoing everything that he had done with

the children.

He wanted to love the children and be their "new

daddy" but could not if they viewed him as a "monster."

He

claimed Debbie was stopping him from being the "boss" (T. 212).
The next day, the argument continued.
9

Defendant

claimed Mikie was coming between them.

Debbie asked, "Well, what

do you want me to do, put him up for adoption?"

Defendant made a

"hostile" reply (T. 213). In the afternoon, Matthew overheard
defendant tell Mikie that he hated him (T. 214).
The next morning, December 16, 1986, defendant, Debbie
and the children drove to Moab (T. 215, 751). When Debbie went
into the library, the others stayed in the truck.
defendant's lap and appeared happy.
and Mikie got some candies.

Mikie sat on

Next, they went to a store

Debbie still wanted to shop so they

went to the Yellow Front store (T. 216).
Debbie had intended for both boys to go into Yellow
Front with her.

But when they got there, defendant "winked" at

her and suggested that Mikie "spend some time with him" (T. 21617, 835). Mikie was unhappy as Debbie left, but he continued to
sit in the truck and eat his candy (T. 217). Approximately five
minutes later, defendant came into the store and yelled for
Debbie (T. 217, 221, 760). He was holding Mikie, who was "limp
and white" and did not appear to be breathing (T. 218).
Debbie drove to the hospital with defendant holding
Mikie on the passenger side.

She thought defendant was

performing mouth-to-mouth resuscitation (T. 218). They reached
the hospital within three to four minutes of leaving Yellow Front
(T. 221).
Debbie ran into the emergency room for help.

When she

returned, defendant was holding Mikie but not performing
resuscitation.

A nurse and Debbie began mouth-to-mouth (T. 219).
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Medical personnel unsuccessfully worked on Mikie, who remained
unresponsive, until the attending physician, Dr. Robert Murray,
declared him dead (T. 224, 359-61).
Hospital personnel asked what had happened.

Defendant

said that he was reading and Mikie was eating his candy.

Mikie

said something and suddenly "his eyes rolled in the back of his
head, and his mouth went tight, and he arched his back and gasped
for air" (T. 225). Defendant thought he was choking so put his
finger down his throat; defendant found nothing (T. 420).1
Defendant told others that Mikie acted like he had a seizure (T.
339-40, 362). Dr. Murray thought Mikie may have had an aneurism
but needed to perform an autopsy to determine the cause of death
(T. 371, 378-80).

Debbie refused because she did not want "him

to cut up [her] baby" (T. 225, 226). Mikie was subsequently
embalmed (T. 226).
Carrying Mikie's body with them, defendant and Debbie
left the next morning for Idaho to bury Mikie at her family home
(T. 226-27).

That night, they stayed in Bountiful, Utah, where

Utah authorities twice contacted them for permission for an
autopsy. Debbie continued to refuse (T. 227-28).

Defendant told

Debbie that the police were not raising questions about her but
about him (T. 228). Bruises which had not been apparent on
Mikie's body in the hospital were now evident.

1

Defendant said

Both Debbie and defendant were trained to perform
artificial respiration; neither found any obstructions in Mikie's
airway (T. 223, 706-07, 836). Medical personnel also found no
obstructions (T. 362, 387).
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the bruises appeared "funny" and "suspicious."

He told Debbie

that if she "was looking for something badf (she would] find it"
(T. 228).
Debbie kept a daily journal.

Defendant told her that

he had read it and that it related their fights over the
discipline of the children.

Debbie did not remember specifically

what she had written but recalled that she had written about the
bruises on Mikie's bottom from defendant kicking him (T. 228-29,
198).

Defendant said that if the police came back with a court

order and searched, the journal would amount to "probable cause"
to take Mikie's body for an autopsy (T. 228-29).

Defendant

suggested that he "rip out" several pages of the journal and
destroy them.

Debbie agreed (T. 229).

In the morning, they continued to Idaho with Mikie's
body (T. 230). Defendant suggested that Debbie could avoid any
worries about a court-ordered autopsy by burying Mikie along the
road or burning his body (T. 230-31).

Debbie refused and Mikie

was buried in Ririe, Idaho on December 20, 1986 (T. 231).
Debbie remained in Ririe with her son, Matthew, and
defendant left for the Delores River area of Idaho (T. 231-32).
In Moab, Matthew had told his mother that defendant "punched
Mikie in the tummy" (T. 311-313).

Now, Matthew repeated that he

had seen defendant "punch and kick Mikie" and had "similar
things" done to him (T. 310). Debbie's attitude changed and she
decided that she would allow an autopsy (T. 232, 310).
Defendant returned to Ririe and reunited with Debbie
12

(T. 231-32).

Debbie told defendant of her decision to allow an

autopsy (T. 232). Defendant became angry, claiming that Debbie
was going to great lengths "to make him look bad" (T. 233).
Contrary to his explanation to Dr. Murray of how Mikie had died,
defendant now told Debbie that he had been reading a book when he
noticed that Mikie was "slumped over in his seat" and was nonresponsive.

When defendant lifted him to carry him into the

store, Mikie's "eyes were rolled in the back of his head real
bad" (T. 233). At another point, defendant told Debbie that
"Mikie stood up, said something, arched his back, and then just
fell forward into [defendant's] arms" (T. 233).2
Defendant and Debbie separated.

Defendant left Ririe.

(T.234). On April 12 and 13th, Mikie's body was exhumed and an
autopsy performed (T. 234, 435).
Dr. Floyd J. Fantelli, a physician and board certified
pathologist, performed the autopsy (T. 429-35).

2

He found that

At trial, defendant admitted that his explanations as to
what occurred when Mikie died were inconsistent (T. 813). He
told Investigator Hines that Mikie "just stood up, got very rigid
and just fell over . . . [Mikie] wasn't choking or . . .
coughing." Defendant was sure that Mikie only stopped breathing
on the way to the hospital (T. 601). Later, in the same
interview, defendant admitted that he had hit Mikie "in the
stomach very hard" and that Mikie had just gone limp (T. 605).
When Hines told defendant that he believed that he had
deliberately suffocated Mikie, defendant responded that he could
not believe that Hines figured out what had happened (T. 603-04).
At trial, defendant testified that he did not know what Mikie was
doing when suddenly Mikie stood up, "waiving [sic] wildly with
his arms." Mikie was "gritting" his teeth but was not coughing
or choking. He "walked over to [defendant] and fell into [his]
arms. . . unconscious" and limp. Mikie's eyes "went over to the
side of his head. He had a — some kind of seizure or something
. . . [h]is back arched, flopped over in the seat" (T. 759-60).
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Mikie had a total of eleven broken or fractured ribs, involving
ribs 1-7 on the right side and ribs 1, 2, 5 and 6 on the left (T.
436, 439). Most of the ribs appeared to have been fractured from
two to six weeks prior to death.

Dr. Fantelli could not

determine if these older fractures resulted from a single episode
or had occurred in multiple episodes within days of each other
(T. 439, 441). However, one of the fractures, rib 7 on the right
side, occurred within hours of Mikie's death (T. 439-41).

Based

on the bleeding at the fracture sight, Dr. Fantelli concluded
that the fracture occurred prior to cardiac resuscitation
efforts, in other words, before Mikie's heart stopped beating (T.
442).

The nature of the fracture was consistent with Mikie

having been substantially hit in the chest area by an adult's
fist (T. 443-35).3
Mikie's body also exhibited significant bruising of
varying ages (T. 447). Bruise 1 was a one inch by one inch
bruise on Mikie's right temple.

The bruise occurred

3

Dr. Fantelli and the other state expert, Dr. William
Palmer, testified extensively concerning the "very flexible"
nature of young children's ribs. Because children's bones are
mostly cartilage, rib fractures are very uncommon in children of
Mikie's age (T. 443, 531, 534). Young children normally only
sustain rib fractures as a result of automobile accidents or
significant trauma consistent with being struck or kicked by an
adult (T. 443-34, 446, 531-32, 571). The doctors believed that
it was "extremely unlikely" that a child's rib would be fractured
as a result of the pressure exhibited during resuscitation (T.
442-43, 535). Dr. Fantelli tested for the presence of any bone
disease to otherwise explain the fractures but found none (T.
444). Defendant's expert, Dr. Rothfeder, agreed with this
testimony (T. 669-71, 679).
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contemporaneous with Mikie's death/

It was consistent with

pressure from a finger or thumb but the pressure needed to create
the bruise was too great for it to have been caused during
resuscitation (T. 448-50, 461; Exhibit 5),
w

Bruise 12 was also a

fresh" bruise, occurring at the time of death.

It was under the

jaw bone, a highly unusual location for an accidental bruise.
Bruise 12 was consistent with having been received through a blow
or sustained pressure.

Because of its unique location, Dr.

Fantelli found it unlikely to have occurred during resuscitation.
In fact, in hundreds of autopsies, he had never seen bruises
occurring in the face area from resuscitation attempts (T. 45152; Exhibit 3).

Bruises 13, 14 and 15, small finger-type bruises

on Mikie's chest were in a knuckle-type pattern, consistent with
a back handed blow to the chest.

Again, Dr. Fantelli concluded

that, due to their location, such bruising would be inconsistent
with any resuscitation efforts (T. 453-55; Exhibit 2). Dr.
Fantelli found two "marks" just behind Mikie's left eye.

These

appeared "fresh" and were consistent with having been applied
with pressure from adult fingernails (T. 456-57, 484; Exhibit 4).
The bruise on the chin together with the fingernail marks near
Mikie's eye were consistent with an adult having placed his
hand(s) over Mikie's face and applying pressure substantially

4

Bruising which occurs prior to death may become more
noticeable after death. This is because as blood drains from an
area, the contrast becomes more apparent (T. 461). In this case,
many of the bruises evident during the autopsy were not as
apparent at the time of Mikie's death but there is no dispute
that Mikie's bruises pre-existed his death.
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greater than that required in resuscitating an unconscious person
(T. 459-60).5
Dr. Fantelli also found an area of significant hair
loss on the back of Mikie's head (T. 447). Because such hair
loss is uncommon in children and Mikie had no skin disease which
might account for it, the doctor concluded that the loss had
occurred as a result of the hair being pulled (T. 446-47).
Dr. Fantelli's examination was to determine a cause of
death and not specifically to determine whether there was
evidence of "battered child syndrome" (T. 496).6

Based on his

lack of information concerning Mikie's family background, Dr.
Fantelli concluded that he could not be medically "diagnostic" of
the presence of battered child syndrome (T. 475, 479, 482).7
However, he was "diagnostic" that the injuries occurred from
significant trauma and were, therefore, "consistent" with
battered child syndrome" (T. 471, 483, 485-86).

None of the

individual injuries were fatal; nor, did Dr. Fantelli believe
5

Mikie had numerous other bruises over his body. These did
not occur contemporaneous with his death but were considered for
diagnosing that Mikie was a battered child (T. 450, 462, 478-80,
572).
6

"Battered child syndrome" is "composed of injuries that
are separated over a wide span of time with varying levels of
healing and injury" (T. 433). It is used medically to determine
the source of "inflicted trauma," that is if a child's injuries
are non-accidental (T. 432-33).
7

When a doctor renders a "diagnostic" opinion, it means the
opinion is "certainly known" (T. 471, 475). When a doctor
describes his findings as being "consistent" with a diagnosis, it
means that the findings are "compatible with fthe diagnosis]
given the circumstances that would make that particular entity
plausible" (T. 371).
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that the cumulative effect of the injuries caused death
(T. 476).8
While Dr. Fantelli was unable to determine the exact
cause of death, he did rule out any natural causes (T. 437). He
found no cardiac problems, no indications of seizure or aneurism
and no injuries to Mikie's internal organs (T. 469, 500, 503).
There were indications of cerebra edema, mild swelling of the
brain caused by a lack of oxygen at the time of death

but no

evidence of choking or aspiration on an object (T. 463-64, 471).
Instead, the lack of oxygen coupled with Mikie's physical
bruising and marks were consistent, but not "diagnostic," of
Mikie having been suffocated (T. 467-69).

If Mikie had been

suffocated by someone placing a hand over his mouth, his
respiratory effcrts would have stopped within two to three
minutes and his heart within another minute or so. Within a
total of three to five minutes, Mikie would have been dead (T.
472, 503).
Dr. William M. Palmer, an expert in child abuse cases,
while agreeing with Dr. Fantelli's autopsy findings, testified
that the nature of the injuries sustained by Mikie was
"diagnostic" of battered child syndrome (T. 518-22, 525-30).

Dr.

Palmer agreed that there was no indication of a natural cause of
death, including any sudden infant death syndrome or cardiac
synosis, and no indications of accidental death (T. 558-59).
8

The state never argued that Mikie's death was a result of
the cumulative effect of being abused. The state's theory was
that defendant had suffocated Mikie.
17

Similarly, he found no evidence of choking, aspirationr or
strangulation (T. 538-39, 541, 553). While unable to be
diagnostic of suffocation, Dr. Palmer found the physical evidence
consistent with Mikie having been suffocated by an adult placing
his hand over his mouth and nose (T. 552-57).9
After his arrest, defendant was interviewed by Michael
Hines, an investigator for the Utah Attorney General's Office (T«
594, 595). Initially, defendant denied ever hitting or hurting
Mikie (T. 600). Hines said he did not believe him and told
defendant that he suspected that:
. . . Mikie was crying because his mother and
his brother were going into the store to shop
for toys, and that this crying frustrated Mr.
Allen [defendant]; and that [Hines] suspected
that Mr. Allen got very rough with the child
because he was crying, and this caused the
child to get even more hysterical and cry
louder. [Hines] suspected that Mr. Allen
then grabbed the child by the nose and the
mouth and held that child very hard. And
that's what killed Mikie.
(T. 603-04).

With this, defendant's demeanor changed and he

became very emotional and teary-eyed (T. 604-05).

Defendant

responded that he could not "believe that [Hines had] figured out
exactly what happened. . . . I've knocked the kid around a few
times, but I didn't

—

I didn't intend to kill him" (T. 604).

When asked to restate in his own words what happened,

9

Defendant's expert, Dr. Rothfeder, agreed with Drs.
Fantelli and Palmer that the physical findings in this case were
consistent with Mikie having been suffocated (T. 674). He had no
significant disagreement with any of the state's medical evidence
(T. 662-63, 664-65, 665-66, 669, 671, 674, 677-78, 679-81, 68283, 689).
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Mr. Allen said that Mikie tried to get out of
the truck, and he opened the door and slid
out. Mr. Allen said: "I grabbed him by the
collar, and I jerked him back into the truck
real hard,11 and that Mikie was then standing
in the truck crying. Mr. Allen said that he
took the back of his hand, and he
demonstrated, and he said: "I hit him in the
stomach very hard." In his words: "Much too
hard for a little kid." And then Mr. Allen
stopped. And there was a relatively long
pause, probably ten or more seconds. And he
said: "He just went limp and fell down."
(T. 605).10
Other aspects of the trial will be discussed in the
body of this brief as pertinent to the argument.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court properly admitted evidence that the
victim fit the battered child syndrome.

Based on the autopsy

findings, the issue was whether the child had died accidently or
intentionally.

Evidence of the battered child syndrome was

probative of this determination.

Likewise, the trial court

properly admitted evidence of prior acts of abuse by defendant of
the victim for purposes of establishing absence of accident and
intent.
Based on the charging document and the extensive
probable cause statement, defendant was fully informed of the

10

Defendant's explanation that he had just hit Mikie "real
hard" and he went limp was considered and rejected as a cause of
death by the medical experts. The doctors testified that a blow
to the chest or stomach area sufficient to cause death would, in
addition to rib fractures, also result in trauma to the lungs,
internal arteries, the heart, the liver, the intestines or the
spleen (T. 445-46, 532-33, 533-34). Here, there were no internal
injuries (T. 465-67, 537-38).
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state's theory and had adequate information to prepare a defense.
Therefore, the court properly denied defendant's motion for a
bill of particulars.

Defendant's motion to have the state elect

a single legal theory on which to proceed was also properly
denied since none of the state's theories were repugnant to each
other.

Further, defendant's request for a general verdict form

with special interrogatories was inappropriate and therefore
properly denied.
The trial court correctly determined that defendant's
confession was voluntary.

Defendant was fully advised of his

constitutional rights and knowingly waived them.

Consequently,

the trial court properly found defendant's confession admissible
and properly allowed the confession to be admitted after the
state had established the requisite corpus delicti.
The court properly instructed the jury, and no error
was committed in denying defendant's requests for lesser included
instructions where the evidence did not permit an acquittal of
the greater offense and a conviction of any lesser offense.
The autopsy photographs introduced were not gruesome
and were probative of the factual determinations in this case.
The trial court properly determined their admissibility pursuant
to rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence.
The trial court properly ruled that testimony of
defendant's conduct and statements concerning the destruction of
evidence was not hearsay, was probative of defendant's state of
mind and therefore was admissible.
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Because the evidence was sufficient for conviction of
murder in the second degree, the court properly denied
defendant's motions to dismiss, motion to arrest judgment and
motion for new trial. No substantial errors were committed by
the trial court and the doctrine of cumulative error is
inapplicable.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED EVIDENCE
THAT THE VICTIM FIT THE CRITERIA OF A
BATTERED CHILD AND PROPERLY ALLOWED TESTIMONY
OF DEFENDANT'S PRIOR ABUSE OF THE CHILD.
Defendant asserts that the trial court improperly
permitted the medical experts to express their opinions on
whether the victim, Michael Barrie, fit the criteria of a
battered child and argues that the trial court improperly
admitted testimony of defendant's prior episodes of abuse of
Mikie.

Defendant does not raise any foundational or sufficiency

challenge to the evidence.

Instead, he claims that the state

used the evidence of battered child syndrome to "leapfrog over
their responsibility to prove the critical elements of intent and
cause of death" (Br. of App. at 12) and to create an inference
that the prior incidents of abuse were medically related to the
cause of death (Br. of App. at 16). Defendant's argument
misconstrues the nature of the evidence in this case and its
permissible use.
Factual Background.
Mikie, an otherwise healthy child, died while alone
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with defendant for five minutes. At the time, no cause of death
was determined.

Subsequently, an autopsy established that

shortly before his death, Mikie received a knuckle-type bruise to
the chest, a fractured rib, an unusual bruise under his chin and
adult fingernail-shaped marks near his eye. Medical opinion was
that these bruises and fracture did not result from resuscitation
efforts.

Instead, the experts agreed that they were indicative

of an adult hitting Mikie with a substantial backhanded blow to
the chest and of an adult holding a hand or hands over Mikie's
mouth and nose and applying substantial pressure.

The only cause

of death consistent with the physical findings was that Mikie had
been suffocated.11

Based on this evidence, the issue at trial

was whether the suffocation had occurred accidently or
intentiona1ly.
To establish that the death resulted from an
intentional act, the state introduced evidence that Mikie, at the
time of his death, had numerous bruises of varying ages, a
substantial area of missing hair, and eleven rib fractures of
varying ages.

These injuries had been inflicted at most over a

six week period, a period of time during which defendant lived
with Mikie.

The experts testified as to the criteria for

battered child syndrome and how the injuries found related to
those criteria.

Drs. Fantelli and Rothfelder found Mikie's

injuries to be consistent with battered child syndrome but,
11

The medical findings have been summarized. A complete
discussion with citations to the record is in the Statement of
Facts, infra, at 13-18.
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without additional information concerning the child's background,
were not diagnostic of the syndrome (T. 471, 475, 479, 482-86,
680).

Dr. Palmer testified that the injuries were diagnostic of

battered child syndrome (T. 527).
To prove defendant's intent, the state also presented
evidence of prior incidents of child abuse and hostile actions by
defendant towards Mikie.

These incidents were admitted pursuant

to rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence.
Battered Child Syndrome
The diagnosis of battered child syndrome is judicially
recognized in Utah.

State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d 539 (Utah 1983).

When battered child syndrome is admitted it "does not directly
indicate the culpability of any particular defendant."
543.

Instead, " [ t ] h e pattern

id. at

of abuse is relevant to show the

intent of the act. . . . In other words, the pattern of abuse is
relevant to show that someone injured the child intentionally,
rather than accidently."

JId. (emphasis in original).

But even

where the syndrome is found to exist, the state retains the
burden of proving who inflicted the injuries. Accord State v.
Worthen, 765 P.2d 839 (Utah 1988); State v. Talbot, 665 P.2d 1274
(Utah 1983).
Without any specific supporting authority, defendant
argues that battered child syndrome evidence may not be
introduced unless the state first establishes a single,
conclusive anatomical cause of death and that the cause of death
is consistent with the pattern of abusive conduct (Br. of App. at
23

15-16).

However, the very nature of the syndrome mandates

rejection of defendant's argument.

The syndrome calls for

••multiple injuries in various stages of healing, primarily to the
long bones and soft tissues and frequently coupled with poor
hygiene and malnutrition, but peculiarly identified by the marked
discrepancy between the clinical or physical findings and the
historical data provided by the parents."
542.

Tanner, 675 P.2d at

Thusf the syndrome necessarily involves varying types of

unexplained injuries.

It is this pattern

of relevant non-

accidental injuries, and not a single type of injury, which is
"independent, relevant circumstantial evidence tending to show
that the child was intentionally, rather than accidentally,
injured on the day in question."

Jd. at 543.

Defendant also

asserts that the evidence of battered child syndrome
"impermissibly tainted" defendant by allowing the jury to infer
that the prior incidents of abuse were "factually or medically"
related to the cause of death (Br. of App. at 16). Medically,
Dr. Fantelli clearly stated that the older bruises and fractures
did not contribute to or culminate in Mikie's death and the state
did not argue otherwise (T. 476). However, the prior injuries
were factually related to the cause of death through their
traditional purpose of establishing the probability that "someone
in a custodial relation to [Mikie] bore him ill will."
Commonwealth v. Labbe, 373 N.E.2d 227, 230 (Mass. App. 1978).
Accord People v. Jackson, 18 Cal.App.3d 504, 95 Cal.Rptr. 919,
921 (Calif. App. 1971) (cited with approval in State v. Tanner,
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675 P.2d at 542).
Based on the facts at issue at trial and applying the
accepted parameters for battered child syndrome evidence, the
trial court properly admitted the experts' opinions concerning
the probability that Mikie was accidently or intentionally
injured.

It was for the jury to determine its weight.

Tanner,

675 P.2d at 544.
Rule 404(b). Utah Rules of Evidence
Distinct from but corroborative of the battered child
syndrome evidence introduced, the state also presented testimony
concerning defendant's prior abuse of Mikie.

This was admitted,

pursuant to rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, not to show
defendant's general disposition towards violence "but to
establish a specific pattern of behavior by the defendant toward
one particular child, the victim."

Tanner, 675 P.2d at 546.

Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion,

id. at 546.

"The

substance of the rule is . . . evidence of other crimes or civil
wrongs that is competent and relevant to prove some material

fact, other
defendant,

than to show merely the general
is admissible."

disposition

id. (emphasis in original).

of the
In

Tanner, this Court determined that evidence of a defendant's
prior abuse of the victim was indeed relevant to prove "absence
of accident or mistake . . ., opportunity, knowledge or the
identity of the defendant as the person responsible for the crime
charged."

id. at 546-47. Accord State v. Phillips, 399 S.E.2d

293, 299 (N.C.), cert, denied, Phillips v. North Carolina, 111 S.
25

Ct. 2804 (1991); State v. Holland, 346 N.W.2d 302, 309 (S.D.
1984); Schleredt v. State, 311 N.W.2d 843, 845 (Minn. 1981).
The rule 404(b) evidence introduced in this case can be
summarized as follows:
1. Deborah Barrie testified that she had
numerous arguments with defendant about his
"gruff" manner towards Mikie as well as his
bruising of her son. Two days prior to
Mikie's death, she observed defendant
strangling Mikie by hanging him by a coat to
the point that Mikie could not breathe and
was limp. See Statement of Facts, infra, at
5-6, 7-10 for complete testimony.
2. Martha Sullivan, Mikie's cousin,
testified that she observed defendant angrily
lift Mikie up by his hair and drag him across
the room. Afterwards, Mikie told Martha that
defendant had been "mean" to him. Another
time, she saw defendant force Mikie to sit in
the snow, dressed only in underpants. See
Statement of Facts, infra, at 6-7 for
complete testimony.
3. Matthew Barrie testified to witnessing
defendant kick and punch Mikie on numerous
occasions. He stated that when his mother
was not at home, defendant was abusive
towards both him and Mikie. See Statement of
Facts, infra, at 6 for complete testimony.
Despite the fact that these incidents all occurred
within a two month period before Mikie's dea*ch, defendant attacks
their admissibility on grounds of reinoteness.

However as

discussed above, these incidents are not singular events but
constitute a pattern of conduct towards the victim which began
almost immediately upon meeting him and continued up until the
date of his death.

Just two days prior to Mikie's death,

defendant attempted to strangle him by hanging Mikie over his
back (T.209-210).

At the time, defendant openly expressed his
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willingness to see Mikie dead by stating that he did not care if
Mikie could not breathe (T. 210). The next day, he told Mikie
that he hated him (T. 214). Twenty-four hours later, Mikie was
dead while in defendant's sole custody.
As recognized by this Court, such incidents and
patterns of conduct "complete the story of the crime" as well as
establish identity, motive, scheme or plan.
548.

Tanner, 675 P.2d at

It was on this basis that the trial court found the

evidence probative under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence.
Pursuant to rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, the court then
weighed that probativeness against any prejudicial effect and
properly determined that it was admissible (Motions 2/12/90 Tr.
at 11-12, 15). Accord Tanner, 675 P.2d at 547.
Defendant concedes that the prior incidents of abuse
may be admissible but argues that, to be admissible, the prior
bad acts must have occurred within days of December 16th and must
"reasonably raise an inference that [defendant] in fact had the
intention of committing murder or child abuse" (Br. of App. at
11, 14). Defendant asserts that no such recent incident was
shown.

To the contrary, Deborah Barrie testified that, on

December 14th, defendant attempted to strangle Mikie by hanging
him over his back.

See Statement of Facts, infra at 8-9.

Applying defendant's criteria, this incident was admissible.
Thus, even if, arguendo, the court erred in the admission of any
of the other more minor incidents of abuse, their admission would
not result in prejudicial error in light of the clear
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admissibility and impact of the December 14th incident.

Accord

State v. Rocco, 795 P.2d 1116, 1118-19 (Utah 1990); State v.
Featherson, 781 P.2d 424, 427-428 (Utah 1989).
Bill of Particulars and Election of Theories
Defendant asserts that the trial court improperly
denied a request for a bill of particulars and a motion for the
state to elect under what theory it was proceeding (Br. of App.,
Point 1(C), at 17). Defendant claims that, without a narrowing
of the factual issues, he was prejudiced in that he was unable to
adequately prepare his medical expert, Dr. Rothfeder, and was
unable to adequately cross-examine the state's experts.

The

facts of this case belie defendant's argument.
Under rule 4(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, a
defendant may move for a bill of particulars "[w]hen facts not
set out in an information or indictment are required to inform a
defendant of the nature and cause of the offense charged, so as
to enable him to prepare his defense."

But a bill of particulars

is not intended to compel the state to disclose all of the
evidence it intends to introduce at trial.
571 P.2d 1351 (Utah 1977).

State v. Mitchell,

Nor must the state disclose the

"exact theory on which [it] intends to proceed" at trial.
v. Butler, 560 P.2d 1136, 1138 (Utah 1977).

State

What is

constitutionally required is that a defendant receive notice of
the "particulars of the alleged wrongful conduct" so as to
adequately prepare a defense.
104 (Utah 1988).

State v. Bell, 770 P.2d 100, 103-

Therefore, "a defendant is entitled to a bill
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of particulars as a matter of right when the notice provided by
the information alone is constitutionally deficient."

State v.

Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208, 1214 (Utah 1987), cert, denied, Fulton v.
Utah, 484 U.S. 1044 (1988).
Here, an extensive probable cause statement was filed
with the original information (R. 14-24).

In it, the state set

forth the factual information relative to defendant's prior abuse
of the victim, the existence of battered child syndrome, the
circumstances of the events of December 16th, defendant's
destruction of the diary, the autopsy findings, and secondary
medical opinion.

Specifically, as it related to the cause of

death, the state gave notice that:
1. Defendant was alone with the victim for
five minutes when according to defendant, the
child suddenly stopped breathing;
2. The autopsy revealed multiple injuries
including fresh bruising and fingernail marks
on the child's face;
3. The autopsy revealed no evidence of any
natural cause of death, including no
indications of disease or seizure;
4. Medical opinion was that the most likely
cause of death was suffocation.
(R. 18-20, 22-23).

Subsequently, defendant moved for a bill of

particulars seeking the cause, time, date, place, and manner of
Michael Barrie's death (R. 65-66).

The state responded in an

extended memorandum reiterating the facts on which it was relying
(R. 79-84), including specifically defendant's acquiescence to
Hines' statement that he had suffocated Mikie by holding his hand
over his face (R. 79).
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In denying the motion for a bill of particulars, the
court concluded that defendant was misapplying the term
"causation."

The court stated that while the state must assert

what actions of defendant caused the victim's death, the state
was not required to prove the exact medical cause of death so
long as it could establish that the actions of defendant resulted
in the death (Motions Tr. 12/19/89 at 21-23).

Since the state

had informed defendant of the general cause of death and of the
specific acts of defendant it was relying upon, defendant could
adequately prepare its defense. Accord State v. Strand, 720 P.2d
425 (Utah 1986); State v. Butler, 560 P.2d at 1138.

Implicitly,

the court found that the state had met its burden of providing
sufficient notice.

State v. Bell, 770 P.2d at 104.

Defendant also claims that the trial court erred in
denying his motion to compel the state to elect a single
subsection of the second degree murder statute on which it would
proceed*

Defendant recognizes that the state need not normally

elect between various statutory theories, but argues that in this
case election should have been made because "cause and manner of
death were not necessarily consistent with each subsection of the
homicide statute" (Br. of App. at 18).

However, defendant fails

to articulate or argue any legal inconsistency.

Instead,

defendant appears to be arguing that the state was arguing
varying factual

theories.

This is incorrect.

Defendant was charged under all four subsections of the
murder in the second degree statute, which reads:
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Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the second
degree if the actor:
(a) intentionally or knowingly causes
the death of another;
(b) intending to cause serious bodily
injury to another, he commits an act clearly
dangerous to human life that causes the death
of another;
(c) acting under circumstances
evidencing a depraved indifference to human
life, he engages in conduct which creates a
grave risk of death to another and thereby
causes the death of another; or
(d) while in the commission, attempted
commission, or immediate flight from the
commission or attempted commission of • . .
child abuse, as defined in Subsection 76-5109(2)(a), when the victim is younger than 14
years of age, causes the death of another
person other than a party as defined in § 762-202.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1) (Supp. 1986).
Throughout the trial, the state relied on only one
factual theory, which was that defendant had suffocated Mikie.
If the jury believed this and found that defendant did so
intentionally, a conviction was supportable under Utah Code Ann.
S 76-5-203(1)(a), intentional murder in the second degree.
However, since subsections (b) and (c) of the statute are simply
variations of (a), a conviction would also be supportable under
these subsections.

State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254, 257-58

(Utah 1988); State v. Russell, 733 P.2d 162, 167 (Utah 1987).
the other hand, the act of deliberately holding a hand over a
child's mouth so that the child struggles to breathe and
eventually loses consciousness qualifies as child abuse under
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On

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109(2)(a) (Supp. 1986). n

The act of

suffocation would also justify conviction under § 76-5-203(1)(d),
the felony murder provision.

Thus, under these facts, the same

act of defendant would support a conviction under each subsection
such that the subsections of the second degree murder statute
were variations of each other.

Therefore, the trial court

properly concluded that no election was required because none of
the theories were "repugnant to each other" (Motions Tr. 12/19/89
at 15-17).13

Accord State v. Butler, 560 P.2d at 1138.

Motion for General Verdict with Interrogatories
Defendant argues that the court's denial of his proposed verdict
form was error (Br. of App., Point 1(D), at 19). Pretrial,
defendant moved for a general verdict form with special
interrogatories (R. 261). Specifically, defendant proposed that
the jury delineate the exact cause of death found, the act of
defendant which resulted in the death, when and where the act was

12

Under the statute, child abuse is defined as the
intentional or knowing infliction upon a child of "serious
physical injury." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109(2)(a). Subsection
(l)(c) of the statute defines "serious physical injury" as "any
physical injury which creates a permanent disfigurement;
protracted loss or impairment of a function of a body member,
limb or organ, or substantial risk of death."
13

The state recognizes that this Court only addressed the
first three subsections of the murder in the second degree
statute in State v. Russell, 733 P.2d at 167. However, defendant
raises no claim that the culpable mental states required for
conviction under those subsections is necessarily repugnant to
the mental state required for common law felony murder. See
State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d at 257-58; State v. Tillman, 750
P.2d at 69. The state has, therefore, limited its argument to
the facts of this case and the issues articulated by defendant.
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committed, the mental state of defendant, what acts of defendant
conformed to the mental state, and whether the jury considered
any of the prior acts of abuse by defendant of the victim (R.
263-66).

In denying the motion, the trial court stated:
. • . the jury does not have to unanimously
agree on various things that are contained in
that interrogatory. I think we can do it by
requested Instructions as to. what should be
done. But I won't give the interrogatories
as outlined by the particular request . . . .

(Motions Tr. 2/12/90 at 24). Under Utah law, the ruling was a
proper exercise of the court's discretion.

State v. Bell, 770

P.2d at 109 n.19 (there is no requirement that a court use a
special verdict form in criminal cases).
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED DEFENDANT'S
INCRIMINATING STATEMENTS MADE TO LAW
ENFORCEMENT.
In his opening and supplemental briefs, defendant
alleges that the trial court improperly admitted into evidence
defendant's post-arrest inculpatory statements to Investigator
Hines.

In essence, defendant's arguments are: 1) that the

statements were involuntary in violation of the fifth amendment,
2) that the statements were made after inadequate Miranda
warnings and in violation the sixth amendment, 3) that no corpus
delicti was established prior to the admission of the statements,
and 4) that the trial court entered inadequate findings in
denying the motion to suppress.

Consistent with defendant's

brief, each ground will be discussed separately.
The voluntary nature of the statements.
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When a defendant objects to the admission of his
statements to law enforcement on fifth amendment grounds, the
state must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the
statements were voluntarily made based on the "totality of all
the surrounding circumstances."

Lego v. Twomev, 404 U.S. 477,

489, 92 S.Ct. 619, 627 (1972); State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 463
(Utah 1988).

An inquiry into voluntariness is never mechanical,

for the court must consider "both the characteristics of the
accused and the details of the interrogation."
at 463.

Bishop, 753 P.2d

But the ultimate inquiry remains the same: Did physical

or psychological force or otherwise improper threats or promises
"induce the accused to talk when he otherwise would not have done
so?"

.Id. at 464 n.75 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.

218, 226, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2047 (1973), and State v. Moore, 697
P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1985)).
As a basis to suppress his confession, defendant
contended that he was "verbally and physically" abused by Montana
law enforcement during his arrest on August 12, 1989, and that
this conduct affected the voluntariness of his statements given
to a Utah investigator a day and a half later (Suppression
Hearing T. 2/22/90 at 157-158).

A suppression hearing was held

in which witnesses, including defendant, fully testified
concerning the circumstances of the arrest and subsequent
interview (Supp. Hearing T. 5-156).

Based on this testimony, the

trial court concluded that there was no "causal connection
between anything that occurred at the time of [defendant's]
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arrest and at the time of the interview that would influence him
to answer questions that he wasn't otherwise ready to do" (Supp.
Hearing T. 2/22/90 at 169). On appeal, defendant challenges this
factual finding.14
The evidence at the suppression hearing amply supported
the trial court's determination.

A substantial manhunt for

defendant was conducted in the Rocky Mountain area (Supp. Hearing
T. 6-7). Ravalli County, Montana authorities received
information that defendant had been sighted in the nearby
mountains.

Their information was that defendant was armed and

dangerous (Supp. Hearing T. 48, 73). On horseback and by
helicopter, they commenced their search (Supp. Hearing T. 49-53).
They found defendant's hurriedly abandoned camp on the Montana
side of the Continental Divide. Continuing their search, they
sighted a horse in the area.

Believing that they were in hot

pursuit of defendant, they followed his trail and located
defendant on the Idaho side of the Continental Divide (Supp.
Hearing T. 73).
When the officers confronted defendant, he would not
identify himself.

Words were exchanged.

Detective Bailey used

vulgarities and was somewhat rough in his handling of defendant.
14

This Court has recently clarified that while the
voluntariness of a confession is ultimately a determination of
law, it is predicated on the trial court's determination of the
facts surrounding the giving of the statement. Thus, the trial
court's "determination of which facts to believe" and its
"resolution of factual questions and the associated determination
of credibility that may underlie the decision to admit" are
"overturned only if clearly erroneous." State v. Ramirez, 159
Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 16 n.3 (Utah April 23, 1991).
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Defendant was belligerent and uncooperative (Supp. Hearing T. 5457; R. 226-37, 437). Aside from the verbal exchange and force
used in hand-cuffing, defendant was not assaulted or physically
injured (Supp. Hearing T. 54). When Sheriff Jay Printz arrived
minutes later, the situation calmed (Supp. Hearing T. 55-57).
Much of the exchange between the arresting officers and
defendant was tape recorded (R. 226-37).

All of it related to

the officers' attempts to identify defendant as "Steven Ray
Allen," concerns for the officers's safety when they found a
knife hidden in defendant's groin area, and concerns for the
officers' safety in having to transport defendant by helicopter
(Id.)

Contrary to defendant's assertions in his brief, the

trial court listened to the tape recording in making his
determinations concerning the admissibility of defendant's
subsequent statements (T. 150, 790). Because Utah had requested
that anyone arresting defendant not interview him concerning the
homicide, no attempt was made by the Montana authorities to
interrogate defendant (Supp. Hearing T. 8, 145). Instead,
defendant was held for the Utah authorities who arrived in
Montana thirty-six hours later (Supp. Hearing T. 9, 54).
Defendant alleged no incidents of mistreatment or abusive conduct
after his mountain arrest.

Once in the jail, he had no further

contact with the officers who had arrested him except for Sheriff
Printz.
The only law enforcement official to interview
defendant was Investigator Michael Hines, Utah Attorney General's
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Office.

Prior to commencing his questioning,

Hines, in the

presence of Sheriff Printz, gave defendant Miranda15 warnings.
While the adequacy of defendant's waiver will be discussed fully
in the following subsection, the trial court found that defendant
was informed of and voluntarily waived his fifth and sixth
amendment rights (Supp. Hearing T. 167-170).

No evidence was

presented that defendant's decision to waive these rights and
speak to Mr. Hines was influenced in any way by the circumstances
of his arrest.

Defendant testified that he was never physically

afraid during the interview and that Hines made no threats or
promises to him to induce his cooperation (Supp. Hearing T. 14344).
Based on this evidence, the court properly found no
factual, and therefore no legal, connection between defendant's
arrest and his subsequent determination to speak to Investigator
Hines.

Specifically, the court stated that even if the arrest

was abusive in the sense of "name-calling," the arrest was "too
far removed" from the circumstances of the interview to have
influenced it.

This was supported by defendant's own testimony

that he was under no fear at the time of the interview (Supp.
Hearing T. 169). Implicitly, the court rejected defendant's
argument that the arrest had "tainted" the interview and instead
concluded that the two events were attenuated.16
15

Based on the

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

16

Defendant predicates his "taint" argument on the claim
that the Montana authorities had no authority to arrest defendant
in Idaho and on his claim of abuse during the arrest (Supp.
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facts, the court properly concluded that the state "had sustained
the burden to show that there was no coercion or undue influence
used in obtaining the statements from the defendant" (R. 545;
Supp. Hearing T. 169).17
Defendant also asserts that the court violated his due
process rights in refusing to admit the tape of his arrest at
trial.

Defendant claims that the circumstances of his arrest

were relevant to the jury's assessment of defendant's statements
(Br. of App. at 25-26).

Based on the court's prior finding that

there was no causal connection between the arrest and defendant's
subsequent statements, the court determined that the tape
contained no material facts relevant to the jury's determination
of the weight and probativeness of the statements (T. 789-94).
Specifically, the court ruled that listening to the tape
"wouldn't help the jury; and it openfs] so many issues where we
Hearing T. 158-59; Br. of App. at 24; Supp. Br. of App. at 12).
However, attenuation is not at issue in this case since it is
clear that the officers had a legal basis to arrest defendant.
Instead, the issue is whether factually the circumstances of the
arrest caused defendant to subsequently speak to Investigator
Hines where he would not have otherwise done so. Accord State v.
Bishop, 753 P.2d at 463-64.
17

In defendant's supplemental brief, he argues that this
Court should reject, on state constitutional grounds, the recent
view of a majority of the United States Supreme Court that a
harmless error analysis may be applied in reviewing the improper
admission of a coerced confession. Arizona v. Fulminante, 111
S.Ct. 1246 (1991). However, it is unnecessary to reach this
issue as defendant's statements were not coerced.
Fulminante did not modify the law regarding voluntary
confessions deemed inadmissible on other grounds, such as Miranda
violations or sixth amendment claims. A harmless error standard
has consistently been applied to these latter violations.
Fulminante, 111 S.Ct. at 1255.

38

might get off on a side track, whether they were correct or not
correct, which we don't think would help in any way of disposing
of the ultimate issues in this case" <T. 790). Additionally, the
court viewed the tape as only recording part of the arrest and
not the entire sequence of events (T. 794). For these reasons,
the court excluded the tape pursuant to rule 403, Utah Rules of
Evidence, in that "the prejudicial affect [sic] on the
proceedings of the trial would greatly out weigh any relevance
that the transcript —

possibly could come from the introduction

of this evidence" (T. 790).
The court did not restrict defendant from discussing
relevant circumstances surrounding the actual interview, only the
events of the arrest itself (T. 790-94).

Nor did the court

restrict the defense from presenting relevant facts concerning
"the physical and psychological environment that yielded the
confession."

Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 689, 106 S. Ct.

2142 (1986).

The difficulty in defendant's due process argument

is that factually defendant never claimed that he was coerced
into making the statements.

Instead, he asserted that Hines had

misunderstood what he had said (T. 795-812).

Thus, the issue was

not the credibility of the confession but the credibility of the
witnesses.

On this issue, the circumstances surrounding the

arrest were irrelevant.
Miranda and Invocation of Counsel
Defendant attacks the adequacy of the Miranda warnings
given defendant but couples this with an claim that defendant
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made "both unequivocal and equivocal requests" for counsel (Br.
of App., Point 11(B) at 26-28).

In making his argument,

defendant misconstrues the facts and improperly interchanges the
protections of the fifth and sixth amendment.18
Turning to the Miranda issue first, prior to
interviewing defendant, Investigator Hines fully advised
defendant of his Miranda rights. Hines testified that he read
the rights from a form and then elaborated and more fully
explained the rights (Supp. Hearing T. 11-13; Exhibit 8).
Defendant, who is college educated, responded that "he would
chose —

that he would talk to [Hines] without an attorney, but

he would chose which questions to answer and that —

which ones

not to answer" (Supp. Hearing T. 13). The interview than
proceeded as defendant wished, with his answering the majority of
questions but occasionally declining to answer a particular
question (Supp. Hearing T. 21-22).
terminate the interview.

Defendant never asked to

He never asked for an attorney except

at the conclusion of the one and one-half hour interview when he
asked if an attorney would be provided in connection with his
extradition (Supp. Hearing T. 18, 29, 142-43).

18

The giving of a Miranda warning is a procedural
requirement to affirmatively demonstrate a defendant's waiver of
his fifth amendment right to remain silent and his sixth
amendment right to counsel. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433,
444, 446, 94 S. Ct. 2357 (1974). However, the two rights are
distinct. Michigan v. Moslev, 423 U.S. 96, 104 n.10, 96 S.Ct.
321, 326 n.10 (1975). See also McNeil v. Wisconsin, Ill S.Ct.
2204 (1991). Here, defendant admitted he never asserted his
right to remain silent (Supp. Hearing T. 129-131, 142-43). Thus,
defendant raises only a sixth amendment claim.
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During the suppression hearing, defendant claimed that
Hines never read his rights to him but admitted that some
discussion of "Miranda" occurred.

While alleging that he did not

know what Hines was talking about, defendant testified that he
understood that he did not have to answer any questions (Supp.
Hearing T. 129-31).

Defendant testified that he told Hines "they

could ask the questions, but I felt that if I didn't feel the
question was right, that I didn't feel like —

unless my attorney

told me that I should respond, that I should respond" (Supp.
Hearing T. 131). Sheriff Printz, who was present during the
interview, verified defendant's willingness to speak with Mr.
Hines and his waiver of his Miranda rights (Supp. Hearing T. 6569).
As to the facts concerning any requests for counsel,
the evidence established that when defendant was arrested, one of
the officers began, but did not finish, reciting defendant's
Miranda rights as a matter of form (R. 227-228).

However, none

of the arresting officers questioned defendant other than to
establish his identity and no discussion of counsel took place.
Despite this, defendant attempts to characterize the arrest
encounter as an equivocal invocation of counsel because at one
point, defendant non-responsively shouted, "Read me my rights";
and, at another time, told the officer with whom he had been
arguing, that he would not give him his name but would talk to
another officer.

Neither of these statements could reasonably be

construed to even be a statement concerning counsel. McNeil v.
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Wisconsin, 111 S.Ct 2204, 2209 (1991) (a request for counsel
"requires, at a minimum, some statement that can reasonably be
construed to be expression of a desire for the assistance of an

attorney in dealing

with custodial

interrogation

by the

police")

(emphasis in original).
Defendant also argues that he made an unequivocal
request for counsel during his booking and processing at the jail
such that Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880 (1981)
should apply.

But the facts do not support this claim.

The

evidence established that while being booked in the jail, a
written form was given to defendant which advised him of his
right to remain silent and his right to an attorney (Supp.
Hearing T. 90-91).

Defendant signed the form but made no request

for an attorney (Supp. Hearing T. 92, 96, 140). Jail personnel
explained their slip system whereby an inmate could make any
written requests (Supp. Hearing T. 95-96).

Defendant never made

any written requests for counsel (Supp. Hearing T. 96-97, 140).
The day-sergeant told defendant that he could discuss whether he
wanted to waive extradition with an attorney.

The day-sergeant

testified that defendant made no request for an attorney (Supp.
Hearing T. 105).
When defendant testified at the suppression hearing, he
claimed that while he was being booked, the jailer asked him if
he would like to make a telephone call and asked him, "Don't you
want to call an attorney?"

According to defendant, defendant

responded that he was not sure who to call and the deputy gave
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him a list of attorneys (Supp. Hearing T. 127). This was
disputed by the jailer.

The jailer state that he did not discuss

an attorney with defendant but simply told him that he could make
a telephone call. When defendant responded that he did not know
anyone in the area, the deputy told him that the phone book was
there if he wanted it (Supp. Hearing T. 94-95).
Two days later, when Hines interviewed defendant, he
was fully advised of his right to have an attorney present but
never requested one (Supp. Hearing T. 11-18, 152-153).
Based on this testimony, the trial court found that
defendant's statements that he had requested an attorney were not
credible (Supp. Hearing T. 167-68).

The court found that

defendant had ample opportunity to request an attorney but never
did so (Supp. Hearing T. 168). Therefore, the court concluded
that defendant had voluntarily waived his constitutional rights
(Supp. Hearing T. 167-70).
The trial court's determination is fully supportable on
the facts and fully consistent with the law.

Here, based on the

evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, the trial court
made the factual determination that defendant had made neither an
equivocal or unequivocal request for counsel.
credibility is entitled to deference.
Adv. Rep. at 16 n.3.

This finding on

State v. Ramirez, 159 Utah

The court then found that since defendant

was provided with full Miranda warnings and knowingly waived
them, the otherwise voluntary statement was admissible.
State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d at 463-467.
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Accord

Corpus Delicti
Defendant is correct in arguing that under Utah law,
the corpus delicti of the crime charged must be established by
clear and convincing evidence before a defendant's confession may
be introduced at trial (Br. of App., Point 11(C) at 31-32).
However, defendant misconstrues the scope of the rule.
"The corpus delicti of murder has two components: (1)
proof that the victim is actually dead, and (2) proof that the
death was caused by criminal means."
439, 478 (Utah 1988).

State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d

This second requirement does not require

proof of the cause of death, as argued by defendant; rather, it
is proven by evidence "that the death resulted from criminal
conduct rather than any accident or from natural causes."

Id.

As discussed fully in Point I of this brief, the
medical evidence established that Mikie had not died of natural
causes. See Statement of Facts, infra, at 13-18. The battered
child syndrome evidence further established the probability that
Mikiers death was not accidental but intentional.

Taken

together, this was sufficient to establish the corpus.

Combined

with the observations of defendant's prior abuse of the child and
the fact that he had sole custody of the child at the time of
death, the evidence overwhelming provided a basis for the
admission of defendaiftosdiirigg

.

Defendant, for the first time on appeal, attacks the
adequacy of the trial court's findings of facts and conclusions
of law regarding the court's determination of voluntariness and
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Corpus Delicti
Defendant is correct in arguing that under Utah law,
the corpus delicti of the crime charged must be established by
clear and convincing evidence before a defendant's confession may
be introduced at trial (Br, of App., Point 11(C) at 31-32).
However, defendant misconstrues the scope of the rule.
"The corpus delicti of murder has two components: (1)
proof that the victim is actually dead, and (2) proof that the
death was caused by criminal means."
439, 478 (Utah 1988).
proof of the cause

State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d

This second requirement does not require

of death, as argued by defendant; rather, it

is proven by evidence "that the death resulted from criminal
conduct rather than any accident or from natural causes."

Id.

As discussed fully in Point I of this brief, the
medical evidence established that Mikie had not died of natural
causes. See also Statement of Facts, infra, at 13-18. The
battered child syndrome evidence further established the
probability that Mikie's death was not accidental but
intentional.

Taken together, this was sufficient to establish

the corpus.

Combined with the observations of defendant's prior

abuse of the child and the fact that he had sole custody of the
child at the time of death, the evidence overwhelming provided a
basis for the admission of defendant's incriminating statements.
Findings and Conclusions
Defendant, for the first time on appeal, attacks the
adequacy of the trial court's findings of facts and conclusions
-44-

of law regarding the court's determination of voluntariness and
waiver of Miranda rights (Br. of App., Point 11(D) at 32).
Because this was not raised below, this argument should be deemed
waived. State V. Steqqel, 660 P.2d 252,

(Utah 1983).

Even considering the merits, defendant's argument must
fail.

While a defendant is entitled to a clear cut determination

of voluntariness, this does not mean that the court must enter
formal written findings.

Certainly, it is better form to do so.

But here after a full evidentiary hearing, substantial briefing
and complete argument, the trial court orally pronounced its
rulings (Supp. Hearing T. 167-73).

This included factual

determinations as well as legal conclusions.

During trial, some

aspects of this ruling were again raised and fully responded to
by the court (T. 789-94).
Contrary to defendant's assertions on page 13 of his
supplemental brief, the trial court made all necessary
determinations.

The court ruled on the issue of attenuation by

finding no causal connection between the arrest and the
statements and clearly resolved the credibility issues raised by
the conflicting testimony of the witnesses (Supp. Hearing T. 16770).

Since the trial court never ruled on pertinent factual

issues, a remand for further findings is unnecessary.
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Be c a n si

I li i

11 i

in ill

m ri i s e i i

In 111 \

I In i '•

?

i i ij unit-Mill

s i n nil II11 I'"' I:I r l n o m e r i

waived. State v. Stecrcrel, 660 V. 2d 252 (Utah 1983).
Even considering the merits, defendant's argument must
1, id i. Il i

hlii II

ni

UP J 1 1 . i n i i i I I i

i mi I, II i 1 t j i I mi

i

mi

ni

I mi

I mi i

i i p i i L e r T i ' L i rinii I f n ' i

of voluntariness, this does not mean that the court must enter
formal written findings,

Certainly»

it is better form to do su.

But here ailer a I nil I II eviaenLiary hearing, i ibsLdiiLial ,bi leiimj
and complete argument, the tiial court orally pronounced its
(,Siii| 11, H e a r i n g "I"" • I u 1 • ? I |

T h i ,s i n c l u d e d f actn ia.1

determinations as we I, .1 as legal conclusions , During tx: ia 1 , some
aspects of this ruling were again raised and fully responded to
nin-r I "III1

HO "I'll | ,

Contrary to defendant's assertions on page 1 3 of h i s
supplemental bri ef, the trial court made all necessary
::ie ber in ii na t :1 ::)i is

hf

fi i iding no causal connection between the arrest and the
s be I: = in: i = i :i bs and clearly resol ved the c r e d i t : , f v issues ra i sed by

70).

Si nee the trial court ruled on a 1 1 pertinent factual

issues, a remand for further findings is unnecessary.

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO INSTRUCT
THE JURY ON THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES OF
NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE, AGGRAVATED ASSAULT AND
CHILD ABUSE WHERE THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE TO
SUPPORT ACQUITTAL OF THE GREATER OFFENSE AND
CONVICTION UNDER ANY OF THE LESSER OFFENSES.
Defendant recognizes that when a defendant requests a
lesser included jury instruction, an evidence-based standard
applies.

State v. Baker. 671 P.2d 152, 157 (Utah 1983).

This

requires the trial court to first determine if the offcmse sought
is a lesser included offense of the crime charged, that is,
"whether the offense is established by proof of the same or less
than all the facts required to establish the commission of the
crime charged."

State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 1986).

If so and "the evidence is ambiguous and susceptible to
alternative explanations," the court must instruct on the lesser
included offense if "any one of the alternative interpretations
provides both a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the
included offense."

Ld.

It is this second prong which defendant

misapplies in his argument that the court erred in refusing to
give additional lesser included jury instructions (Br. of App. at
35-36).
The jury was instructed on murder in the second degree
as well as the lesser included offense of manslaughter (R. 57274, 596, 597-99, 600, 602). On appeal, defendant does not
challenge the propriety of these instructions.

Instead,

defendant asserts that the trial court improperly denied lesser
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included instructions on negligent homicide, child abuse, and
aggravated assault (Br. of App. at 35). At trial, defendant only
specifically objected to the trial court's denial of the
instructions on negligent homicide and child abuse, and merely
generally excepted to "all of our instructions which were not
given or given in another form" (T. 864). Even in objecting to
the negligent homicide instruction, defendant only asserted that
it "certainly would be one option that the jury should consider"
(T. 864). When asked by the trial court to comment on the
court's reasoning that a child abuse instruction was
inappropriate, defense counsel indicated that he had no argument
"other than excepting" (T. 859-60).
When the appropriateness of a requested instruction is
dependant on the presentation of certain evidence at trial, the
mere pretrial submission of a written request for the
instruction should not be viewed as sufficient to preserve the
issue for appeal.

Instead, the party offering the instruction

must advance with specificity the reasons for its proper
inclusion based on the trial facts.

See Rule 19(c), Utah R.

Crim. P. ("No party may assign as error any portion of charge or
omission . . . unless he objects . . . stating distinctly the
matter to which he objects and the ground of his objection.")
Here, the requests for lesser included jury instructions were
submitted prior to trial (R. 548-65).

Under the Baker-Velarde

standard, the applicability of the lesser included was entirely
fact-sensitive and could only be determined after submission of
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all the evidence.

At that point, it became incumbent on counsel

to affirmatively assert why such instructions were now
appropriate.

Having failed to state any factual, and therefore

legal, reasons for the requested instructions, defendant should
be precluded from raising the issue on appeal. Accord State v.
Cantu, 750 P.2d 591, 594 (Utah 1988); State v. Schoefeld, 545
P.2d 193, 196 (Utah 1976).
Even if the merits are considered, defendant's argument
fails.

To justify conviction of negligent homicide, the facts

would have to support a finding that in causing Mikie's death,
defendant was "unaware but should have been aware of a
substantial and unjustifiable risk, or that [he] failed to
perceive the nature and degree of the risk."
655 P.2d 654, 655 (Utah 1982).

Boaaess v. State.

Here, defendant denied any

wrongdoing (T. 743, 759-60, 807-10).

However, the state alleged

that he had intentionally placed his hands over the child's mouth
and nose and suffocated him.

Under the latter facts, there was

no basis to assume that defendant was unaware of the risk to the
child from such culpable conduct.

Therefore, under either

defendant's or the state's theories of the case, there was no
factual basis from which a jury could reasonably conclude that
defendant acted with criminal negligence.

State v. Standiford,

769 P.2d at 267 (a defendant's knowledge of the risk of death can
be derived from the nature of the injuries inflicted); State v.
Velarde, 734 P.2d at 453 (a defendant is not entitled to an
instruction on negligent homicide where no rational view of the
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evidence supports it).
Further, even assuming arguendo that a negligent
homicide instruction would have been appropriate, any error would
be harmless. The jury was instructed on murder in the second
degree and manslaughter.

By convicting defendant of the greater

offense, the jury necessarily considered and rejected defendant's
argument that he acted with any lesser mental state than that
associated with second degree murder.

Thus, defendant has not

established "how, in light of this fact, there is any reasonable
likelihood that if an instruction on negligent homicide had been
given, the jury would have convicted [defendant] of that offense,
rather than second degree murder or manslaughter."

State v.

Gotschall, 782 P.2d 459, 464 (Utah 1989).
Similarly, the only factual basis which would allow the
jury to acquit defendant of murder in the second degree but
convict him of child abuse would be if the jury found that Mikie
died from natural causes temporally and factually independent of
the abuse.

The medical evidence negated such a conclusion.

Additionally, based on defendant's trial testimony denying any
abuse of Mikie at the time of his death, the court expressed
concern that an instruction on child abuse would confuse the jury
into believing that defendant could be convicted simply on the
basis of the prior incidents of child abuse (T. 860). The
court's determination was proper. As long as the jury found that
defendant had physically restrained Mikie from breathing,
defendant was guilty of some degree of murder.
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POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED AUTOPSY
PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE VICTIM PROBATIVE OF THE
CHILD'S CASE OF DEATH.
Over defendant's objections, the trial court admitted
five photographs of the victim taken prior to the autopsy.

The

photographs, exhibits 2-6, depict different bruises and marks on
the body at the time of death.

While defendant characterizes the

photographs as gruesome (Br. of App. at 38), the main thrust of
his argument is that the photographs were irrelevant to the
issues in the case and therefore not probative (Br. of App. at
36-37).
This Court has held that if a photograph is found to be
gruesome, it will generally be viewed as inadmissible unless it
has unusually probative value.

State v. Laffertv, 749 P.2d 1239,

1256 (Utah 1988); State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750, 752-53 (Utah
1986).

However, "photographs that are only negligibly gruesome

have little potential for unduly prejudicing the jury, and their
admission therefore does not constitute an abuse of discretion."
State v. Valdez. 748 P.2d 1050, 1054 (Utah 1989).19
19

This Court has recently clarified that an "abuse of
discretion standard" for evidentiary rulings is misleading.
Rather, evidentiary rulings are matters of law, reviewable under
a correction of error standard. State v. Ramirez, 159 Utah Adv.
Rep. at 16 n.3. However, within this standard, deference has
always been given to the trial court's subsidiary factual
determinations. JEd. The balancing of probativeness and
prejudice required under rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, is one
such area. id. If the trial court's factual determinations are
clearly erroneous or its legal conclusions in error, then the
court has abused its discretion in admitting the evidence. See
Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, No. 900112-CA, slip op. at
3-5 (Utah App. September 6, 1991)
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The photographs in question do not depict open wounds,
blood or any other factor which traditionally has been
characterized as gruesome.

State v. Laffertv, 749 P.2d at 1257

(photographs of baby's neck slit open and mother in unnaturally
contorted position in a pool of blood were gruesome); State v.
Poe, 21 Utah 2d 113, 441 P.2d 512, 514 (1968) (photograph of skin
peeled back from skull during autopsy was gruesome).

The

photographs here are of the child's intact body; only the area of
injuries are shown.

The injuries themselves are the bruising,

fingernail marks and missing hair section.
been made in the body.

No incisions have

Each photograph is small, only 3 x 5

inches, and does not represent any "blowups" of the area in
question.

Taken alone, the photographs are not gruesome.

Accord

State v. Cobb, 774 P.2d 1123, 1125 (Utah 1989) (photograph of
victim's body and wounds did not display gruesome qualities);
State v. Valdez, 748 P.2d at 1055 (photographs of victims' bodies
not particularly bloody or gruesome).
At trial, each of the photographs was probative of the
circumstances under which Mikie had died.

Defendant's position

was that he had caused Mikie no injuries; yet, Mikie died while
in his sole custody.

While not conclusive of an anatomical cause

of death, the experts agreed that the autopsy findings were
consistent with Mikie having been intentionally suffocated (T.
467-69, 552-57).

Under such circumstances, it was imperative for

the jury to assess the nature and extent of the injuries about
which the medical experts were testifying.
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Defendant claims that

a drawing was sufficient to explain the medical testimony.
First, this assumes that the jury does not have the duty to
independently evaluate the basis of the medical opinions.
Second, the trial court is not prevented from admitting
photographic evidence merely because the same information may be
"gleaned" from testimonial sources.

State v. Valdez, 748 P.2d at

1055; State v. Garcia, 663 P.2d 60, 63 (Utah 1983).
Consequently, the trial court properly admitted the photographic
evidence.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED EVIDENCE
THAT DEFENDANT HAD DESTROYED PARTS OF DEBORAH
BARRIE'S DIARY WHICH RELATED TO INCIDENTS OF
ABUSE.
Defendant asserts that the trial court improperly
allowed Deborah Barrie to testify to defendant's destruction of
parts of her diary and to testify to the contents of the
destroyed pages.

Defendant also claims that the court failed to

review the contents of the remaining diary before allowing this
testimony.

Defendant bases his claim of error on rule 802, Utah

Rules of Evidence, maintaining that the testimony was hearsay
(Br. of App. at 39). The argtoment is without merit.
Prior to trial, defendant moved to exclude Debbie's
testimony that one day after Mikie's death, defendant asked her
if he could destroy parts of her diary relating to incidents of
his abuse of Mikie (R. 194-95).

The trial court denied the

motion (Motion Tr. 2/12/90 at 18-19).

The court found that

Debbie was not reconstructing the contents of the diary but was
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simply testifying to defendant's statements and conduct
concerning why he wanted to destroy parts of the diary.

The

court properly concluded that the issue was not one of hearsay
but of relevancy and could, therefore/ be renewed on the latter
grounds at trial (Motion Tr. 2/12/SO at 19). Accord Utah R.
Evid. 801(d)(2).
Additionally, defendant moved for the discovery of the
entire diary, dating from 1986 (R. 339). The state had provided
defendant with a copy of the diary for the time period beginning
with defendant's introduction to Debbie but not with the contents
of the diary for the months preceding their relationship (R. 39699).

In camera, the court reviewed the entire dairy to determine

if any of the previous parts entries contained information
exculpatory to defendant or otherwise relevant (Motion Tr.
2/12/90 at 20). Finding nothing exculpatory or relevant, the
court granted defendant access to the diary for the periods in
which he had contact with Debbie and her sons but denied access
to the remainder of the dairy (R. 543).
Without further objection at trial, Debbie testified
that after she was contacted in Bountiful concerning an autopsy,
defendant told her that the police were not questioning her
actions but were questioning him.

Defendant said that the

bruises on Mikie looked suspicious and that if Debbie was looking
for "something bad," she would find it.

He said he had read her

journal and that she had recorded some of their fights.
Defendant told her that if the police found the journal that
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those entries would be "probable cause" to demand an autopsy.
Defendant asked if he could "rip out" those pages.
agreed.

Debbie

Defendant left the roomf came back and said that he had

destroyed the pages (T. 228-29).

Debbie was then asked if

defendant had told her specifically the contents of the pages. A
general objection was made and overruled (T. 229). Debbie
responded that while she did not remember specifically what she
had written, the fights were about disciplining her children
including the incident where defendant had kicked Mikie and left
bruises on "his butt" (T. 229). Subsequently, Mike Hines
testified that defendant admitted that he had torn a page out of
the dairy relating to his having kicked and bruised Mikie (T.
601).
Relying on cases involving the admission of documents,
defendant argues that Debbie's testimony was untrustworthy (Br.
of App. at 39). Such an argument is totally inapplicable because
the diary was never admitted into evidence nor did the court
allow Debbie to reconstruct the contents of the diary.

All that

was admitted was her accounting of defendant's statements and
conduct concerning his reasons for wanting some entries
destroyed.

She clearly stated that she did not specifically

remember what she had written but she knew the fights referred to
were their fights over the children.

This was not new factual

information; Debbie had already testified to defendant's
admissions that he had kicked Mikie (T. 198-202).

Instead, the

relevancy of the testimony was that after Mikie died, defendant
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destroyed evidence which he believed was inculpatory.

As this

Court has previously determined,
Like resisting or attempting to bribe an
arresting officer, such conduct is relevant
as an admission by conduct, "constituting
circumstantial evidence of consciousness of
guilt" (citation omitted).
State v. Garcia, 663 P.2d 60, 65 (Utah 1983).

Accord State v.

Walker, 595 P.2d 1098, 1100 (Kan. 1979).
POINT VI
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL, TOGETHER
WITH ALL REASONABLE INFERENCES, IS SUFFICIENT
TO SUSTAIN DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION FOR MURDER
IN THE SECOND DEGREE; THEREFORE, THE COURT
PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS TO
DISMISS, MOTION FOR AN ARREST OF JUDGMENT,
AND MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.
In attacking the sufficiency of the evidence, defendant
concedes that the evidence at trial established that Mikie
suffered a pattern of abuse at defendant's hands for the
approximate two and one-half months they were together.

Further,

defendant concedes that Mikie died a non-accidental death due to
suffocation while alone with defendant (Br. of App. at 40).
Defendant asserts, however, that the evidence also supports the
inference that Mikie died from choking on a piece of candy (Br.
of App. at 40-41, 43). From this, defendant argues that the lack
of a conclusive anatomical cause of death renders the evidence
insufficient for a murder in the second degree conviction but
that it could be sufficient for a manslaughter conviction (Br. of
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App. at 41-43). This argument misconstrues the law and facts.20
As conceded by defendant, the evidence clearly
established that Mikie did not die of natural causes. All the
doctors agreed that the physical evidence was consistent with
Mikie having died from a lack of oxygen caused by suffocation.
Despite defendant's assertions to the contrary, the doctors did
not testify that it was equally plausible that Mikie choked to
death.

No evidence was found of obstruction in his airway at the

time of resuscitation nor was any internal swelling, consistent
with choking, found in his throat during autopsy (T. 4(53-64, 471,
538-39, 541, 553). Instead, the bruising and fingernail marks
indicated that a hand had been held over Mikie's face and that,
from the time period involved and the lack of other physical
indica, the medical evidence would support that Mikie had been
intentionally suffocated by an adult (T. 467-69, 552-57).

Even

if, arguendo, defendant's proposition that Mikie choked had some
factually validity, it would not necessarily remove this case
from murder in the second degree for the jury could have still
rationally concluded that Mikie choked to death while being
physically abused by defendant.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(d).

Defendant also argues that the trial court
improperly denied his motions to dismiss for insufficient

20

Neither defendant's brief statement of facts nor his
recitation of the evidence under his sufficiency argument met the
marshalling standard enunciated in Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d
1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). This failure should preclude review of
any insufficiency claim on appeal. In the alternative, the state
will discuss the merits of defendant's claim.
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evidence.

A comparable standard of review applies to a motion to

dismiss based on insufficient evidence as to an insufficiency
claim based on a jury verdict.

In both, the trial court's

decision should be upheld "if, upon reviewing the evidence and
all inferences that can be reasonably drawn from it, [the
appellate court] conclude[s] that some evidence exists from which
a reasonable jury could find that the elements of the crime had
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt."

State v. Dibello, 780

P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah 1S89).
Here, the evidence established that defendant met
Debbie in September and moved in with her by October.

As soon as

Mikie was left alone with defendant, Mikie began sustaining
injuries.

The explanations given by defendant to Debbie for the

injuries were found not to be consistent with the nature of the
injuries discovered at autopsy (T. 446, 465-66, 471, 531-32, 584,
670).
Mikie.

Mikie's brother and cousin both observed defendant injure
Defendant, while minimizing the nature of the acts,

admitted to Debbie and subsequently to an investigator that he
had kicked and hit Mikie. Medical evidence confirmed that
Mikie's injuries were consistent with those of a battered child.
Two days before Mikie's death, defendant attempted to strangle
Mikie because he would not stop crying.

This was done by hanging

him from his coat until Mikie's eyes bulged, he became limp and
appeared not to be breathing.

When Debbie intervened, defendant

did not readily release the child but angrily stated that he did
not care if the child could not breathe (T. 209-11).
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Shortly

after, defendant told Mikie that he hated him (T. 214).
The next time that defendant was alone with Mikie,
Mikie died.

Medical evidence excluded any natural cause of death

(T. 437). The state and defense experts agreed that the physical
findings indicated that shortly before his death, Mikie was
backhanded by an adult with sufficient force to fracture one cf
his ribs.

The experts agreed that an unusually located bruise

under Mikie's chin and adult fingernail marks next to his eye
also indicated that shortly before his death, an adult held his
hand(s) over the child's mouth and nose with significant
pressure.

See Statement of Facts, infra, at 13-18.
The fact that defendant had been inflicting abuse on

Mikie for two months prior to his death and that Mikie died from
a non-accidental injury while in defendant's sole custody would
suffice for conviction.
51.

Accord State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d at 550-

However, there was additional evidence to support

defendant's conviction.

Immediately after Mikie's death,

defendant destroyed evidence which he characterized as
inculpatory (T. 228-29).

When he learned that Debbie intended to

have Mikie's body exhumed and an autopsy performed, defendant
became angry and said that Debbie was trying to make him look bad
(T. 233). When told by an investigator of the state's theory
that defendant had intentionally suffocated Mikie, defendant
stated that he could not believe that the investigator "had
figured it out" (T. 603-04).

He then modified his response by

admitting that he had hit Mikie with a blow of sufficient force
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to fracture his rib and Mikie, without choking or coughing, just
fell limp into his arms (T. 605). Defendant further admitted
that he had given inconsistent statements at various times
concerning how Mikie had died (T. 813). Based on the evidence,
the jury had a substantial factual basis from which it could
conclude that defendant murdered Mikie by intentionally
suffocating him.

Accord State v. Phillips, 399 S.E.2d 293; State

v. Holland, 346 N.W.2d 302 (S.D. 1984); Schleret v. State, 311
N.W.2d 843 (Minn. 1981).
Similarly, defendant argues that the court improperly
denied his motion to arrest judgment (Br. of App., Point VI(B),
at 44). Rule 23, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, in pertinent
part, allows an arrest of judgment "if the facts proved or
admitted do not constitute a public offense . . . or there is
other good cause."

Defendant asserts that the evidence at trial

was insufficient to establish a public offense.

For the same

reasons discussed above, the evidence was sufficient for
conviction.

Therefore, there was no basis to arrest judgment.

State v. Eldredae, 773 P.2d 29 (Utah 1989).
Defendant also argues that the trial court improperly
denied his motion for new trial based on claims of insufficient
evidence and the admission of the rule 404 (b) evidence relating
to prior instances of abuse (Br. of App., Point VI(C) at 45).
This Court has recently clarified that "a trial court's decision
to deny a new trial will be upheld if there is a reasonable basis
to support that decision."

Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange,
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164 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 10 (Utah June 28, 1991).

In this regard,

"a trial judge may not substitute his judgment for the jury; ••
rather, before a new trial would be appropriate, "the trial judge
must be able to articulate a reasonable basis for the
inappropriateness of the verdict."

Id. at 18 n.31.

Here, the

court properly concluded that the interests of justice did not
require a new trial (R. 660).
POINT VII
THE CONCEPT OF CUMULATIVE ERROR DOES NOT
APPLY WHERE NO SUBSTANTIAL ERRORS WERE
COMMITTED.
As a catch-all to his other arguments, defendant argues
that he should be granted a new trial on the basis of the
cumulative errors committed by the trial court.

However, the

concept of cumulative error is only applicable where substantial,
multiple errors have in fact been committed.
P.2d 188, 191 (Utah 1987).

State v. Ellis, 748

Here, no substantial errors were

committed and the doctrine does not apply.

Id.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's conviction for
murder in the second degree, a first degree felony, should be
affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s dJtffftJday of September,
1991.
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